Term
|
Definition
| Games in which join action agreements are not enforceable |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| strategy of a less-informed player to elicit information credibly from a more informed player |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| strategy of a more informed player to convey his “good” information credibly to a less informed player |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a player uncertainty about an opponent’s moves made in the past or made at the same time as her own. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| analyzing the choices that rational players will make at all nodes of a game, starting at the terminal nodes and working backward to the initial node. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a game where each player has two strategies, say cooperate and not, such that the best response of each is to cooperate if the other cooperates, not if not, and the outcome from (cooperate, cooperate) is better for both than the outcome of (not, not) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| the strategy that is optimal for one player, given the strategies actually played by the other players, or the belief of this player about the other players’ strategy choices. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a game where iterated elimination of dominated strategies leaves a unique outcome, or just one strategy for each player. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a game in which the sum of all players’ payoffs is a constant, the same for all their strategy combinations. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| - a game with multiple nash equilibria, where he player are unanimous about the relative merits of the equilibria |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a configuration of strategies for the players in a game, which emerges as the outcome because of the convergence of the players’ expectations on it. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| in a zero-sum game, for the player whose strategies are arrayed along the columns, this is the minimum of the columns over the maximum attained for the same row-column pair. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| - a configuration of strategies one for each player) such that each player’s strategy is best for him, given those of the other players (can be in pure or mixed strategies) |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| a choice over a continuous range of real numbers available to a player. |
|
|
Term
| Opponent's Indifference Property |
|
Definition
| A probability such that the equilibrium mixture of strategies yields equal expected payoffs |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Information asymmetry where a player's type is private information |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Equilibrium that is chosen disregarding communication |
|
|
Term
| Bayesian-Nash Equilibrium |
|
Definition
| Players use their best actions and infer informations from the actions of others |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Strategies are chosen using players' interpretation of communication, and the communication is chose by calculating the actions that will ensue |
|
|
Term
| Incentive-Compatability Conditions (Contstraints) |
|
Definition
| Constraints on an incentive scheme that makes it optimal for the agent of each type to reveal his true type through his actions |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A situation of asymmetry where one player's actions are not directly observable by others |
|
|
Term
| Partially Revealing Equilibrium |
|
Definition
| A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a game of incomplete information where actions reveal some information of the players' types |
|
|
Term
| Participation Condition (Constraint) |
|
Definition
| A constraint on an incentive scheme or screening device that gives the more informed player an expected payoff at least as high as without it |
|
|
Term
| Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium |
|
Definition
| An equilibrium where each player's strategy is optimal at all nodes given his beliefs and beliefs at each node are updatet using information available |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A perfect Bayesian Equilibrium in a game of assymmetric information where actions in the equilibrium cannot be used to distinguish type |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Players who posses different private information in a game of asymmetric information |
|
|
Term
| Semiseparating Equilibrium |
|
Definition
| A perfect Bayesian equilibrium in a game of incomplete information where actions reveal some information of the players' types |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| plan of action that depends on other players' actions in previous plays |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| In a repeated game, the fraction by which the next period's payoffs are multiplied to make them comparable with this period's payoffs |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Rate of return corrected for the probability of noncontiuation of an investment |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A strategy of noncooperation forever in the future. Used as a threat of punishment in an attempt to sustain cooperation |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A repeated game that has no definite end |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| In a prisoner's dilemma with asymmetric players a situation where a large player chooses to cooperate even though he knows that the smaller player will cheat |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| One time costs that induces plays to take actions that are in their joint interests |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Total payoff over time multiplied by the appropriate discount factor to make them comparable to the initial period's payoffs |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Costs that can be inflicted on an individual to induce him to take actions that are in the joint interests of all players |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| One time game is played repeatedly in successive periods |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| In a repeated prisoners dilemma, cooperating on the first play and doing each period what the other player did the previous |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Cooperate until a rival chooses to defect, then switches to noncooperation for a specified period. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Same as opression, forcing a player to accept a lower payoff in asymmetric equilibrium while favored players get higher payoffs |
|
|
Term
| Collective Action Problem |
|
Definition
| A problem of achieving an outcome that is best for society as a whole even if the payoffs for individuals leads to a different equilibrium |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A mode of behavior that is automatically a focal point because it is in each individual's interest to follow it when others are expected to follow too. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A mode of behavior that is automatically a focal point because it is in each individual's interest to follow it when others are expected to follow too. |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| When one person's action affects the payoff of another person |
|
|
Term
| Internalize the Externality |
|
Definition
| Offer a reward or penalty for the external benefits of harm of an individual's actions by bringing his private incentives in line with social optimality |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A situation where players continue in one Nash equilibrium that is worse for everyone than another Nash equilibrium |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| The change in an individuals payoff as the result of a small change in his continuous strategy |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| The change in aggregate as the result of a small change in his continuous strategy |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Benefits that are available to each individual regardless if he has paid the costs |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Benefits that when enjoyed by one person does not detract from another person's enjoyment of the same benefits |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A pattern of behavior that is established in society by a process of education or culture. Someone who behaves differently experiences a negative payoff |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Same as coercion, forcing a player to accept a lower payoff in asymmetric equilibrium while favored players get higher payoffs |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A situation of collective action where no individual knows the right action, so everyone takes cues from each other possibly resulting in the persistence of wrong choices |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A good or facility that benefits all members of a group, nobody can be excluded and one person's enjoyment does not detract from others |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Punishment approved by society for someone who violates an accepted pattern of behavior |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| In a collective game when the payoffs of individuals can be summed, the sum of the total players' payoffs is maximized |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| Externality, When one person's action affects the payoff of another person |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| The process that the more informed player uses to devise the correct set of incentives for the less informed player |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
| A firm charging an individualized prices based on willingness to pay |
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
|
Definition
|
|
Term
| principal-agent or agency problem |
|
Definition
| a game that involves a principal and an agent |
|
|
